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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, In the Interest 
of 
LYNN LUEORN CHRISTENSEN, 
Alleged Delinquent Child. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 7559 
The appellant has adopted as his Statement of 
Facts excerpts from the transcript of testimony and 
insofar as the testimony sets forth material facts, they 
are adopted by the respondent. However, it is deemed 
advisable to set forth a more detailed statement of 
the facts which give rise to this appeal. 
On the 21st day of February, 1950, Lynn Lueorn 
Christensen appeared before the Ron. Sterling R. 
Bossard, Judge of the Juvenile Court of the Fourth 
Juvenile District in and for the County of Sanpete, 
State of Utah, on a petition for delinquency which 
alleged that the child had committed certain acts which 
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would constitute him a delinqu·ent child. At the hear-
ing on February 21, 1950, the child Lynn Lueorn Chris-
tensen was found to be delinquent and was ordered 
on probation (R. 8) The p·resent appeal does not 
contain a record of proceedings had on the 21st day 
of February, 1950. However, the repqrt and the 
petition of the probation officer alleges these facts 
which are not transversed by the ap·pellant 'and may 
be accepted as true. Further, there is no record of 
an appeal from the judgment of February 21 and 
the findings that the child was delinquent may be 
deemed for the purpose of this appeal to nave become 
final. The p·resent case arises upon a Report and 
Petition of the Probation Officer for Rehearing of the 
Case and a Modification of the Order. The petition 
alleges that the child has viol1ated the order of pro-
bation in this: that he "did on May 10, 1950, and on 
several other oc-casions, ~teal a bicycle belonging to 
B·eth Stewart of Ephraim, Utah; that he did damage 
the tires and the seat of said bicycle ; that he had the 
bicycle without ·permission of Beth Stewart and her 
family; that during the past few weeks on several 
ocea.sions, said child did unlawfully enter class rooms 
in the Jr. High School, even after being advised not 
to enter; said rooms were not s-chool rooms in which 
said child has classes; that he has unlawfully on 
different occasions during the past few weeks, entered 
the girls' dressing room unlawfully and that he has 
'also on different · occasions made indecent advances 
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5 
toward girls in the First, Second, and Third Grade 
of Elementary School; that the above actions are 
similar to those of which said child has been accused 
during the past year and s1aid child ha·s been warned 
against continuing- such action" (R. 8). 
On the 12th day of May, 1950, the child appeared 
before the Honorable S. R. Bossard, Juvenile Judge 
of the Fourth Juvenile Court in and for the County 
of Sanpete, State of Utah. It appeared that service 
had not been made upon the parents of the child 
48 hours p·rior to the time of the hearing hut that the 
father Orval Christensen and the child had volun-
tarily appeared before the court; the court advised 
the father of his legal rights and the father asked that 
he be permitted time to get the services of an attorney 
and to be properly served. It was then ordered that the 
matter be set for hearing on the 1st day of June, 1950, 
at 3:00 o'clock (R. 9-10). 
At the hearing of February 21, 1950, the child 
was placed on a suspended commitment to the State 
Industrial School 1and was placed on probation for 
further supervision and study (R. 9). 
On the 2nd day of ~une, 1950, Judge Sterling R. 
Bossard entered a decree and judgment providing 
that ''subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the 
court, the said Lynn Lueorn Christensen is hereby 
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6 
committed to the Utah State Industrial ·School until 
he reaches the age of twenty -one ( 21) or is sooner 
discharged by due process of law; S'aid commitment 
to be for further sup,ervision and treatment;" (R. 21). 
It is from this Order that the appellant takes 
his appeal to this court. 
STATEMENT ~OF POINTS 
I. THE VISION OF THE CHILD IS DEFEC-
TIVE. 
II. WITNESSES IN THIS CASE ON THE PART 
OF THE STATE WERE NOT SWORN. 
III. THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE A 
CAUSE OF ACTION. 
IV. APPELLANT''S POINTS IV, V, VI AND VII 
WERE NOT ARGUED IN APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF AND THEREFORE THEY ARE 
DEEMED -WAIVED. 
V. APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT WITH RE-
GARD TO APPE,LLANT'S P·OINT VIII CON-
CERNING ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE 
CO·NSISTS OF NOTHING MORE THAN A 
NUMBER OF CITATIONS OF AUTHORI-
TIES AND IS N'OT SPECIFIC AND THERE-
FORE SH.OULD NOT BE CONSIDERED 
BY THE COURT. 
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The Vision of the Child is Defective. 
A perusal of the record indicates that the only 
reference to the defective Yision of the child is made 
in a letter written by Dr. H. H. Ramsay, M.D., Super-
intendent of the Utah State Training School, American 
Fork, Utah, which \vas admitted in evidence as Ex-
hibit ''A'' over the objection of the appellant. Were 
the child in this case being committed to the State 
Industrial School for the sole reason th,at he was 
retarded in school, appellant's contention with regard 
to the vision of the child being defective might have 
some merit. AppeYant states in his brief on page 27, 
"there is no mention of the fact that the boy's vision 
is bad, or that he cannot read well in the complaint 
or petition, and it was not an issue in this case excep~t 
that it was made an issue over the objection of the 
defendant.'' Appellant does not point out wherein 
the vision of the child was made 'an issue, and respond-
ent is unable to determine that such fact was an issue 
in this case. Findings of Fact make no mention con-
cerning the defective vision of the child. The court's 
findings that 
''School is quite difficult for said child, espe-
cially the 8th grade work which he has been 
trying to do. S'aid child does have some ability 
when working with his hands. He is unable to 
read above a third or fourth grade level.'' 
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which is supported by the sworn testimony of Glen 
Bartholomew ( Tr. 37-38). 
We respectfully submit, therefore, that plaintiff's 
Point I with regard to the vision of the child is with-
out merit and that the child is not being committed 
to the Industrial School because he has poor eye sight. 
II. 
Witnesses in This Case, on the Part 
of the State, Were Not S~orn. 
With the exception of the question ·asked by Mr. 
Larson, appellant's attorney, and addressed to the 
court, ''Isn't the Court swearing these young wit-
nesses~" (Tr. 100), no reference is made in the rec-
ord nor was any objection raised by appellant because 
the witnesses were not sworn. Marie Dodge, who was 
13 years old, was placed under oath after the Court 
explained that he felt that the young witnesses do not 
a'P'preciate the meaning of an oath (Tr. 100). There-
after when Rue Nielson was called as a witness (Tr. 
111), and when Charles Nielson was called as a wit-
ness (Tr. 115), appellant's attorney did not have these 
young witnesses sworn. Particularly no objection was 
raised at any time during the state's case by appellant 
with regard to the swearing of child witnesses. It is 
fun dam en tal and too well settled in this jurisdiction to 
require citation of authorities, that objection cannot 
be raised for the first time on ap:peal. If Mr. Larson 
had objected -at the time the young witnesses were 
called, the court could have made a dete-rmination as 
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to whether it \vas advisable or necessary to swear 
these \Yi tnesses. 
'Ve submit that the appellant has waived any e~ror 
with regard to the swearing of the witnesses because 
he proceeded \Yith the hearing \Yithout objection. New-
co;nbe v. Wood, 97 lT.S. 581; 24 L. Ed. 1085. It would 
appear, therefore, unnecessary for the court to make 
a determination on this appeal a.s to whe~ther a Juve- . 
nile Court must place children under oath before they 
can testify. Suffice it to say, and we submit to the 
court that this objection cannot be raised for the first 
time on appeal, ,p,articularly in view of the ract that 
the ap1}ellant after not objecting has waived that defect. 
Appellant points out in his argument under this 
point that Exhibits "A" and "B" were admitted in 
evidence over his objection. H·owever, the objection 
was made on the grounds 
''That is not proper, it's irrelevant and not 
within the issues involved in this particular 
case.'' 
True it is the court overruled this objection and 
allowed the introduction of the letter from the Train-
ing School, Exhibit ''A'' and the letter from the Super-
intendent of Schools, Exhibit "B" into evidence. 
Appellant has failed to point out wherein the intro-
duction of these two letters into evidence was ·p~rejudi­
cial to the child. The first letter, Exhibit "A", written 
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by Dr. H. H. Ramsay, Superintendent of the Utah 
State Training School was a report made with regard 
to the physical and mental condition of Lynn Lueorn 
Christensen. No finding of fact was based upon this 
evidence a.nd it is respectfully submitted that the 
rights of the child were not prejudiced by the intro-
duction of irrelevant evidence. 
With regard to Exhibit "B", a letter signed by 
Lel~and E. Anderson and sworn to before Sterling R. 
Bossard, Judge, the court's finding of fact with regard 
to the testimony of Leland E. Anderson was based 
in part upon Exhibit "B" (R. 17). However, Mr. 
Anderson, when called as a witness by appellant did 
testify with regard to Lynn Lueorn Christensen's 
mental aptitude (see Tr. 94), wherein the following 
testimony was recorded: 
"L·ARSON: Has Lynn's wrongful conduct been 
called to your attention~ 
''ANDERSON : All I know is his record, in fact 
I am the one who gives the I.Q. tests to the 
district, and also give progressive activity tests. 
This is in the first, :fif,th, sixth, and eleventh 
grades. I know the record very well. 
"LARSON: Lynn 'probably is behind in mathe-
matics as other students are~ 
"ANDERSON: Academically, he's quite slow." 
Section 14-7-25, Utah Code Annotated 1943, p~ro-
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vi des 1n part that : 
'' * * * * The court may hear evidence in 
the absence of such children, and may compel 
children to testify concerning the facts alleged 
in the petition. The court shall inquire into 
the home environment, history associations and 
general condition of such children, 1nay order 
physical and mental examinations to be made 
by competent physicians, psychologists and 
psychiatrists, and may receive in evidence the 
verified reports of probation officers, physicians, 
psychologists or p·sychiatrists concerning such 
matters.'' 
It is submitted that in view of this section that the 
receiving into evidence of the sworn statement of 
Leland E. Anderson, which Inerely sup~ports the sworn 
testimony, was not prejudicial error. 
III. 
The Complaint Does Not State a Cause of Action. 
The appellant in his statement of points apparently 
argues that the "complaint" or petition does not state 
a cause of ·action. Numerous statements are made, 
none of which point out clearly wherein said com-
plaint fails. Ap.p~ellant apparently takes the view that 
the petition does not co-ntain all -of the essential ele-
ments necessary in order to bring the ·child properly 
within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. Section 
14-7-13 provides as follows. 
'~ The petition shall be verified; alleging 
briefly and in a g~neral way the facts which 
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bring the child within the jurisdiction of the 
court, stating the name, age and residence of 
the child; the names and residences of his par-
ents, (a) of his legal guardian, if there is one, 
(b) of the person or persons having custody 
or control of the child, and (c) of the nearest 
known relative, if no parent or guardian can 
be found. If any of the facts herein required 
are not known by the petitioner, ~the petition 
shall so state. 
"The proceeding shall be entitled. 'State of 
Utah in the interest of _____________________________________________ _ 
delinquent child' (or a dependent or neglected 
child, or a child otherwise within the jurisdic-
tion of the court, as the case may be.) '' 
This section obviously refers to the proceedings 
which initially are instituted in order to bring a child 
within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. In this 
case, however, Lynn Lueorn Christensen was on the 
21st day of February, 1950, adjudged to be a delin-
quent child and committed to the Utah State Indus-
trial School until he reached the age of 21 or was 
sooner discharged by due process of law. The execu-
tion of the order was suspended until May 15, 1950, 
at which time the actions of s:aid child were to be 
reviewed to determine whether further treatment was 
needed (R. 15). The Report and Petition of Probation 
Officer for Rehearing of Case and Modification of 
Order alleges that the child violated the order of 
probation. In the Order for hearing dated 12th of 
May, 1950, and signed by the Court (R. 9) the court 
stated that ''the child was placed· on a suspended com-
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mitment to the State Industrial School and placed 
on probation for further supervision and study.'' 
'Vhile nothing in the record now before this court 
indicates ""hat the exact terms of the p~robation were, 
it must be assumed from a reading of the report and 
petition (R. 8) that the actions of the child set forth 
in the petition \Yere a violation of his probation. The 
statutory provisions of Title 14, Utah Code Annotated 
1943, do not set forth in specific language what type 
of proceeding must be had once a child has been ad-
judged delinquent and placed on a suspended com-
mitment or probation. 
In the case of Stoker v. Gowans (1915), 45 Utah 
556, 147 Pac. 911, this court upon ap~peal from the 
judgment of the district court denying a writ of 
habeas corpus discuss·ed the powers and duties of the 
Juvenile Court and held : 
"We thus have an act which practically con-
fers parental powers and duties upon the Juve-
nile Court. How can another court thus be 
called on to review every act of the juvenile 
court which may in some way and by some 
parents or guardians be considered inimical to 
the· delinquent~ Moreover, how can :a law be 
framed so as to define and provide for every 
act the court shall take or order that it shall 
or may make respecting the care, custody, con-
trol, or conduct of all delinquent children~ To 
attempt this would be as impossible :as it is 
imp~ractical. It seems to us that by suspending 
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the supposed sentence the court did no more 
than if it had in the first instance committed 
Fern to the custody of the ~probation officer, 
and had required her to report to the court 
from time to time, and had thereafter, upon 
application of such officer, modified the original 
order or judgment by ordering her committed 
to the Industrial School. The only difference 
is that the court made the order of commit-
ment upon the first hearing, and then condi-
tionally suspended its operation. and, after the 
probation officer made application to the court 
in which he alleged that Fern had violated the 
conditions hnposed by the court upon which 
sentence was suspended, then ordered that she 
be committed. The pvroceeding may have been 
somewhat irreg~ar, but, under the provisions of 
the law, it w:as not void''. (Italics added.) 
After discussing other points, this court affirmed 
the order of the district court, denying the writ of 
habeas corpus. In this case, as in the Stoker case, 
the court made an order of commitment upon the 
first hearing and conditionally suspended its opera-
tion. Also it appears here, as in the Stoker case, 
that the child violated conditions imposed by the court 
on which sentence was suspended. It is therefore 
respectfully submitted that the action of the Juvenile 
Court in committing Lynn Lueorn Christensen to the 
Utah State Industrial School, while there may have 
been some irregularity, is not void. 
No case has been found in which this court has 
discussed the question as to whether a juvenile once 
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committed to the Utah State Industrial School and 
having had his commitment stayed and being p~laced 
on probation is entitled to a hearing. The reasoning 
of ~Ir. Justice 'Y olfe in the concurring opinion in 
the case of Christensen v. Harris (1945), 109 Utah 1, 
163 Pac. (2d) 314-318, discussing the question of 
revocation of a suspended sentence in the criminal 
case may readily be applied to the situation now 
before this court. There it was said: 
''In probation as in parole the defendant is 
convicted and has only conditional liberty. When 
a law intended to benefit a convicted defendant 
is so construed as to require formal pleadings, 
right of counsel, formal hearing with. all the 
judicial trimmings and right of appeal just to 
insure against the possible rare case of arbitrary 
action ~y a judge; it goes . a long way to dis 4 
courage a judge from granting probation and 
defeats the salutory purposes of the act. A 
judge may feel in a doubtful case that if he 
tries p~robation, the convicted defendant will be 
put in. such strategic position as to virtually 
defeat needed revocation. I have expressed my 
willingness to go along with the Zolintakis case 
if it is construed only as requiring that before 
probation is revoked the probationer be given 
a he:aring on the question of whether he has 
violated the ·conditions of his probation. I do 
not think he need be notified in writing as to 
the facts relied upon for revocation, nor that 
he is entitled to counsel, nor that the hearing 
be formal. A hearing implies a right to present 
relevant evidence. I think the right to examine 
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and cross-examine witnesses is largely in such 
type of case in the discretion of the judge who 
granted probation. The intent of the law was to 
give the judge a supervisory jurisdiction over the 
probation and if we are to adhere to the holding 
that the defendant is entitled to a hearing, we 
should hold that it is in the nature of an inquiry, 
the nature and extent of which is largely in the 
discretion of the judge. The judge could call 
in the probationer, question him on matters 
which were brought to the judge's notice by 
others. Whether the probationer should be con-
fronted by those witnesses is within the choice 
of the judge. The inquiry need not extend 
beyond an informal hearing and certainly need 
not be expanded into a formal trial. It is not 
to be presumed that the judge will be arbitrary. 
It is to be presumed that he will act on a 
reasonable fa.ctual basis. The judge had abso-
lute discretion to grant or refuse probation. 
If we hold that he has a limited discretion in 
revoking, I think we · are going beyond what 
the statute intended but certainly with a right 
of appeal, the rights of the probationer which 
we have judicially given him are sufficiently 
protected without hold:i.ng that he is entitled to 
all of the formality and procedure which due 
process may require in the case of a man 
charged but not convicted of a erime. It seems 
to me the appeal should be limited to determine 
only whether the trial judge was arbitra.ry in 
revoking the suspension. And if he accorded 
a hearing on reasonable notice and reasonable 
opportunity to the defendant to p·resent his side 
of the story, the judge could not be said to have 
been arbitrary at least in regard to procedure.'' 
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As in the case of a criminal on probation, it 
·would seen1 that the rights of a child who has been 
adjudged a delinquent, are amply protected if he is 
given a hearing in which he has the opportunity to 
present his "\Yitnesses and to be confronted by witnesses, 
with the right of cross-examining such witnesses with 
regard to the violation of his probation or the condi-
tion of a suspended commitment to the Industrial 
School. 
In the petition (R. 8), Mr. Calvin M. Kempf 
stated that he (Christensen) did "on May 10, 1950, 
and on several other occasions, steal a bicycle belong-
ing to Beth Stewart of Ephraim, Utah; that he did 
damage the tires and the seat of said bicycle ; that 
he had the bicycle without permission of Beth Stewart 
and her family;'' Even assuming that the child would 
be entitled to a formal hearing on a petition to modify 
an order of commitment, we submit that the petition 
sufficiently advises the child as to the charge made 
against him with regard to the bicycle to enable him 
to answer the same. 
Section 14-7-25, Utah Code Annotated 1943, with 
regard to proceedings before the Juvenile Court pro-
vides: 
'' * * * The court may conduct the hear-
ing in an informal matter and may adopt any 
form of procedure in such cases which it deems 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
best suited to ascertain the facts relating to 
such case and to make a disposition in the best 
interests of such children and of the public * * *. '' 
In view of this provision, it is submitted that it 
matters not that the probation officer denominated 
the taking of the bicycle as "stealing a bicycle", and 
further conceding that what the child, in this case, 
did was ''nothing more than riding of a bicycle 
around a school yard'', such action on the part of 
the child would seem to be in violation of the Order 
of probation, particularly in view of his action in 
damaging the tires and the seat of the bicycle. 
The court in its findings of fact stated (Tr. 16): 
"Further testimony was given that a bicycle 
belonging to Beth Stewart had been taken on 
different occasions and the seat and tire cut 
and ruined by a knife. The evidence was con-
flicting, although it a~ppeared to the court that 
the testimony did show that the bicycle was 
taken by Lynn Christensen and damaged by 
him. ·Also, there was no provocation for taking 
or damaging the bicycle. By the evidence, it 
was shown that although said child, Lynn 
Christensen, denied taking .the bicycle or dam-
aging the tire or seat, he and his father did 
replace the tire with a new one.'' 
We submit that this finding is supported by the 
evidence even though such evidence was, as stated by 
the court, in conflict. See testimony of Richard Wright 
( Tr. 42-48) ; and testimony of Michael Lund ( Tr. 50). 
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The finding of the court that the bicycle was taken 
by Lynn Christensen and damaged by him is further 
supported by the uncontroverted testimony of Beverly 
Stewart that he and his father did replace the tire 
with a new one (Tr. 54). 
The petition further states (R. 8): 
"That during the past few weeks on several 
occasions such child did unlawfully enter class 
rooms in the Jr. High School, even after being 
advised not to enter; said rooms were not 
school rooms in which said child had classes.'' 
The plaintiff states that 
"The statement that the child did unlaw-
fully enter class rooms is merely a conclusion 
and even the allegations of the petition are 
not supported by the testimony." (Plaintiff's 
brief, pp. 30-31). 
The court found with regard to this matter: 
''That he had told said ·child that he was 
not to enter said class rooms after 3 :30 in the 
afternoon; and that it was necessary on two 
or three occasions to send him home for being 
in said class rooms in violation of his order." 
(R. 15 ). 
This finding, we submit, is supported by ~the testi-
mony of Glenn Bartholomew: 
''BARTHOLOMEW: Well, one of the contacts 
I've had with Lynn is the problem that I talked 
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over with his mother about him leaving school 
after 3:30. 
''LARSON: He was there then~ 
''BARTHOLOMEW: I talked with Lynn about 
this personally, about his leaving the building 
at 3:30, and it was with the wishes of his par-
ents that we have him come home at · 3 :30. 
That's what we wanted him to do because we 
felt that would probably help ·clear up some of 
the difficulties with Lynn. We felt that con-
siderable of his trouble has been caused because 
of his idle time and hanging around school 
with nothing to do. I have, a time or two, 
had to send him home from school at 3:30. * * * '' 
(Tr. 37). 
This finding is further supported by the testimony 
of Wayne Graser where he testified as follows: 
"P. 0. KEMPF: What was your reaction when 
you caught him~ The first time' 
''GRASER: I asked him why he had not gone. 
He said he didn't know. I don't know just 
exactly what I said, but I told him that I 
wanted him to get dressed .and get out of there 
is a big hurry, which he did. By the time I 
locked up or got ready to· lock up, he had left.'' 
(Tr. 79). 
We submit to the court that the child's action in 
having to he sent home several times at 3 :30 and 
having to be sent out of the gymnasium whether 
"unlawful" or not, was in violation of the conditions 
of his parole. 
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Appellant com!plains that ''there is no allegation 
here to the effect that the parents are unfit, incom-
·petent, or that they have knowingly failed and neg-
lected to provide for said child the proper mainten-
ance, care, training and education required by both 
law and morals.·" (Plaintiff's Brief, p. 31). It is sub-
mitted that no such allegation is necessary even on 
original proceedings. The statute, Section 14-7-13, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, does not require such an 
allegation; nor is it necessary that there be any allega-
tion that a child has been tried on probation in the 
custody of his parents or that said parents have 
ever, either of them, been conviGted of a felony as 
contended by appellant (Appellant's Brief, p. 31). 
Section 14-7-31, Utah Code Annotated 1943, .provides : 
''No ·child as defined in this chapter shall be 
taken from the custody of its parents or legal 
guardian without the consent of such parents 
or legal guardian, unless the court shall find 
from the evidence introduced in the case that 
such parent or legal guardian is incompetent, 
or has knowingly failed and neglected· to pro-
vide for such child the proper maintenance, 
care, training and education contemplated and 
required by both law and morals, or unless a 
child, being a . ward of the court, has been 
tried on probation in the custody of its parents 
or legal guardian and has failed to reform; or 
unless either parent, having full custody and 
control over a child, or the child's legal guard-
ian, has been convicted of a felony; or· unles~s 
the court shall find from ·all the circumstances 
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m the case that public welfare or the welfar~ 
of a child requires that his custody . be taken 
from its parents or legal guardian." 
Admittedly the Juvenile Court must find from the 
evidence either that the .parent has knowingly failed 
to provide the child with proper m·aintenance and care 
contemplated and required by both law and morals, 
or, shall find from all the circumstances in the case 
that the welfare of the child requires that its custody 
be taken from the parent. There is nothing in this 
record to indicate whether the Juvenile Court made 
such a finding in the original proceedings or not. 
However, it is submitted that inasmuch as no appeal. 
w.as taken that it must be presumed that the former 
order of commitment was in all reS'pects regular and 
that such a finding was made. The court did, how-
ever, conclude that "from the experience of said 
child while on probation, he is not able to get such help 
{specialized, su.pervised treatment) in his home or 
in the community; it is therefore to the best interests 
and welf~are of said child that he be committed to the 
State Industrial School * * * and that the parents 
of necessity be deprived of the care, custody and 
control of said child.'' ( Tr. 19) 
All of plaintiff's argument with regard to the 
question as to whether the "complaint" states .a cause 
of action assumes that a formal complaint in this 
type of hearing is necessary. Such, we submit, is not 
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the case. It is the contention of the respondent that 
the fundamental issue decided by the Juvenile Court 
was whether Lynn Lueorn Christensen h·ad violated 
the terms of his probation and whether the suspended 
commitment committing said child to the Utah State 
Industrial School should be revoked. It is submitted 
that ""hen considering any of the arguments of coun-
sel for the appellant with regard to a cause of action 
that there is sufficient competent material evidence in 
the record to support the court's findings and conclu-
sions that the child's probation should he terminated 
and the order of commitment issued. The testimony 
of the high school coach, Mr. Wayne Graser (Tr~ 
78-82) concerning the child's actions and his conduct 
with a little girl is sufficient, we submit, to warrant 
the revocation of the probation. The petition alleges 
as one of the reas-ons that the child had violated the 
order of probation was that he, Lynn Lueorn Chris-
tensen, "has also on different occasions made indecent 
advances toward girls in the first, second and third 
grade of the elementary school.'' 
IV. 
Appellant's Points IV, V, VI and Vll Were Not Argued in 
Appellant's Brief and Therefore Th·ey Are Deemed Waived. 
It is fundamental that an appellant who assigns 
errors must, .as a general rule, argue such errors or 
otherwise they will be deemed waived. Plaintiff's points 
IV, V, VI and VII were stated apparently as errors. 
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However, no argument was made of such points either 
in the Statement of Points or in that section of 
plaintiff's brief denominated "Argument". In the case 
of Felkner v. Smith (1931), 77 Utah 410 296 Pac. 776, 
an assignment of error was made by the plaintiff but 
was not argued in the briefs. The court there held: 
''That assignment of error is not argued in 
appellant's brief and, therefore, it is deemed 
waived." 
In the case of Sandall v. Sandall (1920), 57 ~tah 
150, 193 Pac. 1093, the ap~·ellant assigne'd errors which 
were not referred to in appellant's brief. The court 
In discussing the question of such omissions held: 
"Such omissions on the part of appellant 
are in disrega,rd of the rules of practice of this 
court and have been condemned by the decisions 
of the court in every case with which w·e are 
familiar wherein the objection has been season-
ably made and relied on. To cite all the cases 
so holding would require more space than ought 
to be accorded an entire opinion in an ordinary 
case. We cite a few, however, as a gentle re-
minder: Walker v. Cont. Ins. Co., 2 Utah 331; 
·People v. P·eacock, 5 Utah 237, 14 Pac. 332; 
. Herriman Irr. Co. v. Keel, 25 Uta,h 96, 69 Pac. 
719; Warren v. Robison et al., 25 Utah 205, 
70 Pac. 989; Beatty v. Shelly, 42 Utah, 593, 132 
Pac. 1160; Egelund v. Fayter, and cases cited. 
51 Utah 579, 172 Pac. 313; Holt v. Great Eastern 
Casualty Co., 53 Utah 543, 73 Pac. 1168.'' 
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v. 
Appellant's Argument With Regard to Appellant's Point 
Vlll Concerning Admission of Evidence Consists of Noth-
ing More Than a Number of Citations of Authorities and 
is Not Specific and Therefore Should Not Be Considered 
By the Court. 
There can be no particular disagreement with 
the rules set forth by appellant in discussing Point 
VIII with regard to the admission of evidence. How-
ever, it is not pointed out wherein such rules are 
applicable to the case at bar, and particularly there 
is no specific error argued by counsel under this point. 
The general rule is as stated in 3 Am. J ur. 296, Sec. 708 : 
''The general rule that assignments of error 
must be specific applies to assignments based 
on the rulings of the trial court in regard to 
matters of evidence. Thus, an assignment of 
error in the admission or ·exclusion of evidence, 
to be sufficient, must be specific and must 
clearly indicate the particular rulings complained 
of. It will not b'e considered where it does not 
set out the testimony referred to with the 
specific objection thereto, nor give the page of 
the paper, book or record where it is printed 
in its regular order.'' 
We submit, therefore, in view of the vagueness of .. 
the argument, and the fact that there is no specific 
argument with regard to Point VIII, that the court 
should not ·consider such point. 
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CONCLUSION 
In . conclusion the respondent respectfully submits 
that the appeal herein presented is without merit and 
that the Order of the court committing the child to 
the Utah State Industrial School should be sustained. 
While there are some irregularities, it is our contention 
that they are not prejudicial to the rights of the child. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General. 
G. HAL TAYLOR 
Assistant Attorney General. 
Attorneys for Res,tp_1ondent. 
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